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1. INTRODUCTION 
This Master’s thesis is a single case study that focuses on the EU officials’ discursive construction of 
Europe in the case of Ukraine as a significant Other playing an essential role in the construction of 
the European Self. In particular, the European Commissioners’ discourses concerning the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations as well as the conceptions of ‘Europeanness’ 
and ‘Eastness’ will be analysed to define different categories of ‘European countries’ which are not 
limited to the dichotomous classification of European countries which are part of the EU and those 
which are not.  
 
This thesis argues that European borders are paradoxical; Europe’s  permanent borders can only be 
established if all dimensions of European borders are coherent with one another. As there have been 
numerous debates among European elites regarding the boundaries of Europe, questions have been 
raised when it comes to what defines a ‘European country’ and what ‘Europe’ means in relation to 
its constitutive ‘East’. These concepts have been constantly contested and the EU’s boundary-
drawing practices are legitimized by these concepts as reflected by the European Neighbourhood 
Policy and Enlargement Negotiations. On one hand, the concept ‘Europeanness’ is understood as ‘the 
geographical imagination of a progressive and secure Europe’ (Kuus, 2007, p. 150) , which does not 
draw a clear spatial boundary with European countries without a membership in the EU; on the other 
hand, Kuus also states that there is no fixed place of where ‘Eastness’ is located exactly, which makes 
it problematic to differentiate Europe’s Self from its Other.  
 
Considering  the ambiguity of these concepts, a constructivist approach will be taken to conceptualise 
how Europe is understood with the starting point that Europe is not just a given by human senses, but 
it is rather the product of people’s conceptualisations (Kratochwil, 2008). To this end, this thesis aims 
at describing the paradox of European borders through the changes of discursive construction of 
Europe; how ‘Europeanness’ and ‘Eastness’ are understood within the EU Commissioners’ 
discourses on Ukraine as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy.  
 
Ukraine is the most relevant case of study to illustrate the paradoxical nature of  the construction of 
European borders within the EU official discourse. The EU simultaneously includes Ukraine in 
certain policy areas but excludes Ukraine from being part of the EU institutions to allow full 
participation of policy areas.  
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While Georgia and Moldova also share similar situations with Ukraine that they all have conflicts 
with Russia to different extents, the EU’s sanctions against Russian annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea 
make it a unique phenomenon; the above cases cannot be comparable with that of Ukraine because 
there were two colours revolutions in Ukraine as along as an on-going open conflict with Russia that 
includes sanctions by the EU, therefore this case illustrates the European Neighbourhood Policy and 
Eastern Partnership. 
 
The research puzzle lies in the contradictions within different EU’s boundary-drawing practices. 
Throughout the period of 2014-2015 in Ukraine, the EU institutions were active to take different 
measures against Russia, such as imposing sanctions ,travel bans and freezing assets. During the EU-
Ukraine Summit in 2017, the EU’s logic of inclusion applied to Ukraine as ‘the European Union 
acknowledges the European aspirations of Ukraine and welcomes its European choice’ (Tusk, 
Remarks by President Donald Tusk following the EU-Ukraine summit in Kyiv, 2017, p. 1); on the 
other hand, an official EU factsheet explicitly excluded Ukraine as an Eastern Partnership country 
from being part of the EU accession process (EEAS, 2017).  
 
Hence, Ukraine is not a complete outsider from Europe despite of the fact that none of the Eastern 
Partnership countries including Ukraine has joined the EU Enlargement process (Munter, 2019). The 
case of Ukraine is worth studying to exemplify the complexity of the connections between borders, 
identity and othering in order to make sense of how these physical outer borders are legitimised.  
 
Analysing the EU official discourse on Ukraine regarding the ENP highlights different dimensions 
of boundary-drawing practices of the EU which discursive dispersion and different articulations of 
European identity will be concerned. Ukraine’s ‘in-betweenness’ will be taken into consideration as 
the identification of Ukraine’s place in Europe is linked with how Ukraine is constructed within the 
EU official discourses on the EU Neighbourhood Policy including Eastern Partnership and the 
Association Agreement. The European external borders are shaped not just by the normative and 
material structures of the EU, but also the discursive practices of the EU officials on how ‘European’ 
Ukraine is.  
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The main focus of this thesis is to examine the changes of collective meanings of ‘Europeanness’ and 
‘Eastness’ throughout different periods of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), including its  
implementation before launching Eastern Partnership, the establishment of the Eastern Partnership as 
well as the launch of the Association Agreement within the Eastern Partnership countries. Hence, the 
research questions which stem from the main focus are as follows:  
 
1) How is Europe discursively constructed through the EU Commissioners’ discourses on 
Ukraine as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy?  
2) How are the discursive constructions of Europe changed in terms of the concepts of 
Europeanness, Eastness and border during 2004-2016?  
 
To reach the goals of identifying Europe’s discursive constructions and their changes, official texts 
from the EU Commissioners are collected to identify the discourses and the changes of discourses. 
168 statements and speeches between 2004 and 2016 are collected from the EU Commission Press 
Release Database online. Only texts mentioning ‘Ukraine’ are selected from the official category of 
policy area ‘European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR)’ in the EU 
Commission’s official search engine. A Foucauldian approach of discourse analysis will be applied 
to locate discursive constructions of Europe, identify different political discourses on European 
external borders, examine the ENP as the action orientation, and explore the relationship between the 
EU official discourse and the ENP.  
 
Committed with an assertion of anti-essentialist ontology and anti-foundationalist epistemology, the 
research design follows several post-structuralist presuppositions of discourse theory which connects 
with the research problem on the collective understanding of ‘Europe’. The first presupposition is 
that ‘identity is shaped in and through its relation to other meanings’ (Torfing, 2005); in other words, 
there are always certain discursive contexts that condition how singular meanings or identities should 
be analysed. It is especially applicable to this particular research on the discursive construction of 
Europe in terms of bordering and othering. Secondly, according to Torfing’s interpretation on 
discourse theory, discourse is presupposed to be ‘constructed in and through hegemonic struggles 
that aim to establish a political and moral-intellectual leadership through the articulation of meaning 
and identity’(ibidem, p. 15) , which presupposes ‘Europeanness’ is dominant over ‘Eastness’ due to 
the former concept’s hegemonic struggles over the latter. The last presupposition is that ‘the 
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hegemonic articulation of meaning and identity’ (ibidem, p. 15) is related to how social antagonism 
is constructed; such antagonism implies that the Other is threatening and the logic of exclusion is 
needed in order to make the discursive system stabilized while preventing the closure of this system.  
 
The theoretical section of this thesis offers five discourse theoretical positions regarding what 
discourse theory stands and how it legitimizes the understanding and explanations of the concepts of 
‘border’, ‘Europeanness’ and ‘Eastness’. Holding an anti-essentialist position of understanding this 
subject of matter, Torfing (2005) insists that no value exists outside discourses, which make discourse 
analysis directly relevant to the discursive construction of Europe and its European external borders. 
The link between ‘understanding’ and ‘explanation’ also adds value this thesis to focus on what 
Europe means rather than why the European Neighbourhood Policy was implemented in the 
beginning.  
 
Within this context, multiple interpretations of the construction of European outer borders are 
elaborated in terms of the nature of  hard and soft borders and how these borders are mutually 
constitutive with one another. While the hard borders are not the focus of this thesis, they are clearly 
defined in order to show what legitimizes the European external borders and normalizes the discursive 
practices done by the EU Commissioners. To further discuss the soft side of European external 
borders, Othering and the formation of European collective identity will be introduced to connect the 
concepts of boundary-drawing practices and identifications of ‘Europe’ and the ‘East’. The case of 
Ukraine will be discussed as it is the manifestation of the boundary-drawing practices  by the EU 
officials and Ukraine’s liminality adds value to this thesis to make sense of the discursive changes of 
Europe’s soft borders through different stages of the development of European Neighbourhood Policy.  
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2. CONCEPTUALISING EUROPEAN EXTERNAL BORDERS  
This section aims at synthesizing different dimensions of understanding European external borders 
through exploring the relationship between their dynamics of openness and closure, Othering as 
boundary-drawing practices and collective identity formation. ‘Border’, in simple terms, refers to the 
product of human agency instead of the natural product of geography; the act of bordering provides 
exclusion and inclusion through different social realms (Diez, Stetter , & Albert, 2004). In this vein, 
the concept of borders is ontologically prior to identity; identity is a product of bordering and othering, 
therefore this chapter begins with the section on dynamics of openness and closure, followed by 
Othering and the formation of identity.   
 
2.1. DYNAMICS OF OPENNESS AND CLOSURE 
The dynamics of openness and closure of European borders can be understood as the combination of 
hard versus soft borders and open versus closed borders. Hard borders refer to different political 
institutions that separate states; soft borders are defined by cultural characteristics which can be either 
open or close to outsiders.  
 
The openness of borders can be understood as a malleable structure being responsive to changes 
(Delanty, 2006). This open structure is the inclusion of horizontal communication and coordination, 
interconnections between regional boundaries and overlapping networks, as well as sustaining 
external and internal ties by trust and shared norms among EU countries (Dimitrovova B. , 2010). 
 
This way of understanding the European external borders is supported by Rumford, who 
conceptualised the idea of network Europe into ‘a network polity linked by new forms of connectivity 
prompted by global flows of capital, goods and services and the mobility enjoyed by persons, 
enterprises and forms of governance’ (Rumford, 2006). In addition to Europe’s borders in the global 
context, Rumford(ibidem) maintains that Europe and its cultural meanings have been intertwined 
with each other, therefore the meaning of European external borders are related to culture.  
 
A soft border means that it is subject to changes in terms of cultural factors. These European external 
cultural borders are soft in nature. They are drawn by the extent of EU values including democracy, 
diversity, human rights, civil liberties and the rule of law being shared between the Union and its 
neighbours (Dimitrovova B. , 2010). However, Dimitrovova also claims that the discourses on 
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common European values between the EU and the ENP countries as highly contested, showing that 
the construction of European external borders is paradoxical as the discourses of inclusion and 
exclusion coincide with each other within the European context.  
 
The European hard borders are related to the membership of  EU institutions concerning the 
policymaking process of the EU. They are clearly defined and these borders are not as malleable as 
the soft external borders. This is the dynamic of closure which can be arguably framed as a 
‘monotopia’, a unified space where there is limited restriction on the movement of goods, peoples, 
capitals and labours (Jensen & Richardson, 2004). However, such definition of the European hard 
external borders tends to overlook the dynamics of European space with its neighbouring countries 
in terms of extensive educational, economic and civil society networks which undermine the closure 
of European external borders through full EU membership. In this way, the definition of soft borders 
is more holistic and meaningful to be the focus of this thesis as it takes all of the above into account.  
 
As argued by Gerard Delanty (2003), the ‘logic of closure’ implies that there are unambiguous 
territorial and civilisation borders. Apart from cultural transformation envisaged by different waves 
of EU enlargements, there are different forms of transitions, including the transitions from political 
authoritarianism to democracy, state socialism to market economies, industrial culture to postmodern 
culture, and national to transnational order (Delanty, 2003).  In spite of the interaction of various 
‘civilizational constellations’, it remains challenging to apply the logic of closure of European 
external borders (Delanty, 2003). In terms of civilisation, Delanty defines it as an analytical concept 
which is heterogeneous by nature and changes continuously, comprising many diverse units.  
 
The degree of openness of European external borders corresponds to boundary-setting of different 
EU policies. Its openness remains fuzzy as some non-EU members are part of the Schengen Area and 
European Customs Union, while some EU members are part of the Euro area which becomes subset 
of the EU. Considering the logic of ENP and EaP, the inside-outside distinction is blurred, different 
degrees of Europeanness dictate the political, social and economic positions of EU neighbours and a 
‘European identity’ is linked with the bilateral agreements between the EU and certain third countries. 
Such political practices constitute the European external borders as being both exclusive and inclusive 
at the same time (Grzymski, 2018). Therefore, the complexity of European external borders go 
beyond the oversimplification of EU insiders and outsiders, centre and periphery (Tonra, 2009).  
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2.2. OTHERING AS BOUNDARY-DRAWING PRACTICE 
Having defined the European external borders as a combination of open, close, hard and soft borders, 
boundaries are needed to materialize the meanings of Europe through exploring Self-Other relations.  
Othering is the process of creating an in-group and an out-group of which the characteristic of Other 
is differentiated from the Self (Staszak, 2008). Setting boundaries is equivalent to the practice of 
othering–boundaries draw lines of separation or contact in multiple contexts. These ‘lines’ can be 
drawn upon between territories, groups and individuals (Newman & Paasi, 1998). They are 
constituted by social action and create identities and are, at the same time, created through identity 
(Newman & Paasi, 1998). Boundaries help to understand political life by examining how they are 
justified through different themes such as citizenship, identity, exclusion and inclusion (Paasi, 2005).  
 
Concerning boundary-drawing practices, Prokkola (2011) points out that social institutions and 
power relations are symbolised by state borders. He further claims that people’s identity narratives 
and mindscape will then become the extension of social norms and values which are embedded into 
state borders as institutions. The boundary-drawing practices are manifested by the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and its subcategory Eastern Partnership, which constitute Europe’s image of 
other in terms of Europe’s representation of advancement, modernity, and embodiments of  progress 
and liberty (Grzymski, 2018). The ENP is a case in point of the EU’s boundary-drawing practice 
manifesting the boundary between ‘chaos’ and ‘cosmos’, of which its neighbours are defined as a 
zone of chaos representing the Other of “proper Europe” (Joenniemi, 2008). As Joenniemi points out, 
the EU’s boundary-drawing practices also demonstrate a certain degree of pragmatism which is 
implied within the ENP; a line was drawn between offering membership prospects as well as offering 
economic, administrative and transactional benefits to the neighbours.  
 
The notions of othering can be categorised into spatial and temporal. Spatial and temporal othering 
are interdependent, depicting the transcendence of condition of every historical move (Prozorov, 
2010). The very essence of temporal othering means the Self is constructed through identifying its 
own past as the constitutive Other which prevents the Self to repeat its own past to become the future. 
Within the context of Europe, there are other strategies of constructing Europe’s collective Self and 
its constitutive East as the Other. According to Thomas Diez (2006), the representation of the Other 
can be seen as inferior, different, and violating universal principles. He claims that the European Self 
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is often constructed with superiority over its Eastern European Other, though the Self can also be 
constructed as the universal standard of values or merely different than the Other.  
 
2.3. FORMATION OF IDENTITY AND ITS ALTERNATIVES  
The complexity of construction of Europe’s hard, soft, open and closed external borders implies that 
the EU’s boundary-drawing practices construct multiple dimensions of identity beyond a simple Self-
Other dichotomy. To conceptualise the term ‘identity’, this section briefly discusses how identity is 
understood by scholars, followed by three clusters of alternatives including ‘identification’, ‘self-
understanding and ‘commonality, connectedness and groupness’ to lay a foundation for further 
discussions on the formation of European collective identity in the next section.  
 
The definition of identity has been contested from an individual level to a national level among 
different fields of study. Some core claims on identity are that it is relational, malleable and socially 
constructed; identity is constructed based on what it is and what it is not (Tonra, 2009). Tonra also 
maintains that discursive acts constantly contest any hegemonic or dominate definition of identity. 
These claims are supported by symbolic interactionism in sense of  the formation of an individual 
identity through socialisation (Rumelili, 2004). To put it differently, instead of conceptualising 
identity as a static entity, it is conceptualised as a process which is in the making progressively 
(Mälksoo, 2010). 
 
In terms of identity, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) suggest that there are ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ versions 
of interpreting identity; the former stresses on the essentialist understanding that identity exists across 
persons with group boundedness and homogeneity, while the latter insists that the term ‘identity’ is 
so elastic. These versions are considered to be problematic as the ‘strong’ conception of identity 
assumes that it is an everyday experience which is embedded into common sense, yet the ‘weak’ 
conception of identity is too ambiguous to carry out analytical work.  
 
To substantiate the discussion on the understanding of identity, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) 
introduced three clusters of terms to better explain the use of identity–identification, self-
understanding, as well as commonality, connectedness and groupness.  
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The first cluster is identification. ‘Identify’ is an active and processual verb which contains no reifying 
connotations of ‘identity’ (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). While this process is naturally adhered to 
social life, the strong version of “identity” is not. Brubaker and Cooper argue that the term 
‘identification’ does not assume the act of identifying by powerful agents such as the state will 
necessarily end up with bounded groupness, yet the process of identifying can be situational and 
contextual. They point out that there are relational and categorical modes of identification; a relational 
mode of identification concerns how one identifies any person by status in a relational web of kinship, 
while the categorical one concerns how a person identifies someone by membership “in a class of 
persons sharing some categorical attribute” (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, p. 15).  
 
Brubaker and Cooper also introduced the term ‘self-understanding’ as ‘one’s sense of who one is, of 
one’s social location, and of how (given the first two) one is prepared to act’ (Beyond "identity", p. 
17). While this term suggests certain understandings of self and social location govern individual and 
collective action, this ‘self’ of the term ‘self-understanding’ does not refer to the modern 
understanding of ‘self as a homogeneous entity. Instead, the term ‘self-understanding’ does not 
connect with the ideas of being the same or different in terms of semantic meanings.  
 
The last cluster of terms offer alternatives for ‘identity’ are ‘commonality’, ‘connectedness’ and 
‘groupness’. According to Brubaker and Cooper (2000), ‘commonality refers to certain attributes 
which are shared by individuals, ‘connectedness’ is the linkage among people, and ‘groupness’ is 
‘the sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded, solidarity group’ (Beyond "identity", p. 20). These 
terms are productive to extend the discussion on the understanding of identity through developing 
analytical idioms with regards to different forms and degrees of commonality and connectedness.  
 
The above alternatives of understanding identity avoid defining identity as malleable, relational and 
socially constructed (Tonra, 2009), thereby substantiating the discussion on the understanding of 
identity through other alternatives including ‘identification’, ‘self-understanding’ as well as 
‘commonality’, ‘connectedness’ and ‘groupness’. Therefore,  identifying ‘Europeanness’ and 
‘Eastness’ of a state can also be situational and contextual as suggested above; the EU’s self-
understanding on Europe is a factor of governing  its collective actions, in which EU member states 
share certain attributes with a sense of belonging to constitute European collective identity.  
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2.4. FORMATION OF EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE IDENTITY  
The formation of European collective identity mostly concerns with identification instead of the 
ontological understanding of identity itself. As explained in the previous section, focusing on 
identification of European collective identity is a more effective means to understand how European 
collective identity is imposed by the EU institutions than studying European collective identity itself 
through conflictual self-identifications from the officials of different hierarchies of institutions 
(Lebow, 2016). This way of conceptualising the formation of European collective identity offers a 
more comprehensive view of how the EU officials discursively construct Europeanness and Eastness 
by drawing the boundaries between ‘proper Europe’ and Eastern Europe, thus identifying the EU as 
proper Europe and Ukraine as Eastern Europe.  
 
In terms of external and internal identifications, there are three different tensions as illustrated below 
(Lebow, 2016). The first tension is arisen from identification imposed by different sub-state and state 
actors; the second comes from the similarities and differences derived from self-identification of 
states’ roles, affiliations and relationship to political bodies; the last tension ties with multi-
dimensional identifications imposed to policymakers by different commitments and behavioural 
expectations. These tensions show that there are different dimensions of identifying Europe and 
Ukraine by the EU officials within different contexts. In other words, to stabilise the discourses of 
Europeanness and Eastness within the contexts of border construction, it would be the most 
productive to study these discourses within a particular period of policy implementation to avoid 
some of the tensions mentioned above.    
 
Another perspective of viewing the formation of European collective identity is that the European 
Union takes the concept of ‘Europe’ as its own, essentialising itself as the representation of the 
concept of ‘Europe’ (József & Kovács , 2001). In this regard, Europe’s identity is differentiated from 
what Europe is not. There is a blurred line between Europe and non-Europe due to different extents 
of associations between the EU and other non-EU countries. Currently, the EU consists of 28 
countries in association with non-EU countries within the Schengen Area and the European Economic 
Area. It means there are nuances regarding what defines EU membership as there are other non-EU 
countries association with the EU countries through opening internal borders and access to the 
European Single Market.  
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When the EU claims to represent ‘Europe’, it also implies that non-EU European countries from the 
Eastern Partnership programme (Van der Loo, 2017) are being represented conceptually without 
participating the institutions. This way of European collective identity formation is linked to the 
openness of European external borders as there are interconnections between regional boundaries of 
EU and non-EU countries which differentiate Europe’s Self from the non-Europe Other as a 
continuum from negative to positive. Given that Europe is a ‘network polity’ (Rumford, 2006), its 
formation of collective identity is tied by shared norms among EU countries as well as other non-EU 
countries which are located at the opposite end of the continuum of Europe’s Self.    
 
In this section, three dimensions of tension of self-identification were introduced to show the 
discrepancies of  how the EU policymakers identify Europe in conflictual ways under different 
circumstances. Europe is identified and represented in different ways, so that the boundary-drawing 
practices of Europe and non-Europe result in different versions of ‘Europe’. To better understand 
how the construction of European external borders result in differentiating Europe’s Self and its 
constitutive ‘East’ as the Other, the concepts of Europeanness and Eastness will be used to explain 
this phenomenon in the case of Ukraine.   
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3. EUROPEANNESS, EASTNESS AND UKRAINE’S ‘IN-BETWEENNESS’ 
3.1 DEFINITION OF EUROPEANNESS  
To further extend the discussion on the conceptualisation of European external borders, Europe’s Self 
and its constitutive Other are located at the opposite ends of the same continuum, which means that 
there are multiple versions of Others that help constitute European collective identity. While 
Europeanness is one of the defining characteristics of European collective identity, it can exist within 
and outside of the European external borders due to the cultural dimension of borders which is soft 
in nature and subject to changes.   
 
Investigating ‘Europeanness’ is a continuous concern within the dominant conceptions of Europe. 
These conceptions are economically, culturally and politically defined by the EU’s (then European 
Economic Community) founding members, which means that ‘Europe’ is a prosperous capitalist 
contemporary space being capable of establishing universal moral standards through its normative 
power (Manners, 2002).  
 
Europeanness can be defined as the progressive character of Europe’s Self constituted by its backward 
past through temporal and spatial Othering. Given the spatial definition of Europe, Prozorov (2010) 
states that the logics of spatial and temporal othering in contemporary European politics are 
intertwined empirically, or in other words,  temporal and spatial othering are mutually dependent. He 
builds upon Kojèvian’s definition of self-transcendence by indicating the indissociability of spatial 
and temporal othering, saying that Europe negated its present-being into the past after World War II 
and embarked a future-oriented project to integrate other European nation-states. The self-
identification of Europe was based on the  ‘interstice between the Othered past and the not-as-yet 
attained present’ (Prozorov, 2010, p. 1281). 
 
Considering ‘European’ as collective identity with a continuum from negative to positive, the degree 
of  ‘Europeanness’ is, then, reflected upon the amount of EU laws and regulations implemented by a 
state to become European. Europe’s identity is constructed within and outside of the European 
continent by spatial terms, existing at global, pan-European, national, (sub) regional and local levels 
through discursive practices (Morozov & Rumelili, 2012). It implies that ‘Europeanness’ does not 
necessarily refer to the feature of EU countries, but also non-EU countries surrounding the EU. 
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The mutual dependence of spatial and temporal Othering gives ground to the gradual change of 
Europeanness as the EU institutions anticipate changes. Given that there is no denial of the existence 
of core-periphery dichotomy of Europe, the process of European integration leads to an increasingly 
post-western shaped Europe (Delanty, 2007). Delanty argues that the EU enlargement has shifted the 
geopolitical influence eastwards with ‘a polynational and polyethnic policy complicated by a more 
multicentric and transnational political order’ (2007, p. 14). In this sense, the change of EU external 
hard borders also constitutes the change of its soft border, thereby incorporating Europeanness with 
cultural characteristics endowed by Central and Eastern European countries.    
 
The differentiation of Europeanness within Europe has also been confirmed by numerous scholars.  
For Kuus (2007), Europe can be seen as a combination of different zones of political actions with 
different degrees of Europeanness. It means that the political power of EU member states within the 
EU institutions can affect the extent of Europeanness these EU countries possess. Within this context, 
the understanding of Europe can be flexible as the very being of Europe varies (Joenniemi, 2008);  
however, the defining characteristic of European identity construction remains a generalised East 
(Neumann, 1999).   
 
Being the constitutive Other of Europe, the generalised East includes Eastern European countries 
which gradually move closer to the core of Europe through the inclusion of Central and Eastern 
European countries due to the EU enlargement in 2004. Arat-Koç (2010) argues that Eastern 
European countries started to be attracted by the notion of ‘being European’ after the end of socialist 
period; such obsession is related to different types of erasure and exclusion such as how these 
countries attempted to re-define themselves to align with the rest of EU member countries.  
 
The mutual constitutiveness of ENP creates outsiders who are managed by the insiders within the EU 
institutions, yet these outsiders have to adopt EU internal standards (Kuus, 2011). The EU outsiders 
look at the EU, an idealised version of Europe at its very core (Grzymski, 2018) ; on the other hand, 
the new post-communist Central European countries are closer to the idealised Europe than Eastern 
Partnership(EaP) countries as the former joined the EU in 2004. This idealised version of Europe 
indicates different gradients of being European.  
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Europeanness is, therefore, the product of the dynamics of European external borders which exists 
within and outside the idealised version of Europe (the EU), thereby defining the characteristic of 
European collective identity through differentiating a range of gradients of progressiveness from the 
core Western European countries to Central and Eastern European countries, then from these 
countries to the non-EU Eastern European countries.  
 
The above definition of Europeanness helps understand where the paradoxical nature of European 
borders lie; different gradients of Europeanness were illustrated to show that the discursive 
constructions of Europe include the core of Europe as well as Central and Eastern European countries 
as part of the generalised East which was absorbed by the EU due to the enlargement process. Since 
the degree of Europeanness is subject to the changes of different forms of European external borders, 
conceptualising Europeanness narrows down the categories of analytical units in order to locate the 
changes of discursive subject during a specific timeframe.  
 
3.2 EASTNESS AND EASTERN EUROPE  
Being the opposite end of the continuum of Europeanness, Eastness can be understood as the negative 
characteristic of Eastern Europe against everything about Europeanness. As defined in the previous 
section, given that Europeanness exists within and outside the idealized version of Europe (the EU), 
Eastness can also be embedded within the EU institutions due to the incorporation of Central and 
Eastern European countries which are not fully transformed into ‘proper Europe’ as suggested in the 
previous section. As the result of the paradoxical nature of European external borders, the 
differentiation of Europe and Eastern Europe (in non-geographical terms) endow different degrees of 
Eastness in both Europe and Eastern Europe, which is contradict to the universal moral standards that 
define Europe and exclude ‘the East’ from becoming European.   
 
Within the geographical space of Europe and the existence of EU institutions as hard borders, 
Eastness, as defined ambiguously, is a reference of an insecure periphery of Europe which is needed 
to construct European collective identity (Neumann, 1999; Kuus, 2007). Europe needs the imaginary 
existence of the ‘East’ in order to inscribe European collective identity, of which Europeanness and 
Eastness complement with each other in different gradients.  
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In the same vein, Eastern Europe and the Orient are not essentially identical, even though both of 
them are the Others of Europe’s  prosperous capitalist contemporary space (Manners, 2002). Eastern 
Europe is framed within geographical Europe without being fully European; it is located between the 
East and the West; this in-betweenness is ‘the repository of Eastness within’ (Kuus, 2004). On the 
other hand, the Orient is constructed from an ‘uncritically essentialist standpoint’ (Said, 1979) which 
confirms the West by observing the Orient from afar and talking about it from above, producing a 
sense of superiority and hegemony over the East. Whilst the images of  Eastern Europe  and ‘the 
Orient’ are overlapping, the conception of ‘Nesting Orientalisms’ (Bakić-Hayden, 1995) explains the 
gradation of Orientalism regarding the pattern of how the Orients are reproduced: Eastern Europe is 
less ‘East’ than Asia, whereas the Balkans are orientalised as the most “eastern” region within the 
reproduction of Eastern Europe’s gradation by itself.  
 
The notion of ‘Nesting Orientalisms’ (Bakić-Hayden, 1995) corresponds multiple versions of Eastern 
Europe with different gradients of Eastness due to the emergence of an increasingly post-western 
shaped Europe (Delanty, 2007). While the spread of Europeanness towards the East does not dissolve 
Eastern Europe, the re-inscription of Otherness of the East attributes different dimensions for 
Europeanness versus Eastness, delineating the opposition of Europe and the East. 
 
Considering Europe’s Self as the product of both spatial and temporal Othering, its constitutive East 
can be understood as the remnant of Europe’s past as the result of EU’s boundary-drawing practices. 
Following this logic of Othering, Eastern Europe is invented as a product of 18th century according 
to the categories and principles of the Enlightenment, namely rationalism and secularisation, 
commercialisation and industrialisation, as well as the emergence of bourgeoisie and the dominance 
of bureaucratic nation-state (Wolff, 1994; Todorova, 1997). Hence, the understanding of Eastern 
Europe as the backward version of Europe originates from the imaginary existence of this insecure 
periphery space in temporal terms.  
 
The endowment of Eastness from Eastern Europe to Europe (in non-geographical terms) denotes a 
quasi-civilisation as Eastern Europe represents an intermediate position between proper Europe and 
Asia, making Eastern Europe ‘quasi-European’ (Wolff, 1994). On the other hand, Russia can be 
understood as the ‘second other’ of Europe which appears to be ‘the East’, offering an opposition to 
show what Europe is different from the construction of this version of the East (Eder, 2006).  
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In this section, Eastness was introduced as the juxtaposition of Europeanness, denoting the degree of 
geographical Europe’s insecure periphery inscribed by multiple versions of Eastern Europe. The 
differentiation between Eastern Europe and the Orient also coincided with the conception of 
Europeanness as a continuum; Central and Eastern European countries within the EU endowed less 
Eastness compared to that of non-EU Eastern European countries, thereby Othering Russia ‘the East’ 
in spatial terms. The logic of temporal Othering also applied when Eastern Europe was claimed to be 
the invention of 18th century according to Wolf (1994). The notion of Eastern Europe to be ‘quasi-
European’ (ibidem) depicts non-EU Eastern European countries endowed lower degree of 
Europeanness and higher degree of Eastness compared to those of Central and Eastern European 
countries within the EU.     
 
3.3 UKRAINE’S EURO-EASTERN ‘IN-BETWEENNESS’ 
Ukraine endows both Europeanness and Eastness as an Eastern European country abiding EU norms 
and regulations while facing more than two decades of challenges of post-Soviet legacies including 
corruption, cronyism and authoritarianism. This is an illustration of the paradox of European borders 
as Ukraine has been excluded from the European hard borders through the ratification of Association 
Agreement without mentioning any possibility for accession talks, while including Ukraine within 
the European cultural and civilisation borders through recognising Ukraine as a ‘European country’ 
(EEAS, 2015, p. 2). In this section, Ukraine’s ‘in-betweenness’ will be explained in terms of 
Europeanness, Eastness, borders, Othering and identity to make sense of how this unique case adds 
values for studying the construction of European external borders and formation of European 
collective identity.  
 
Ukraine is a case in point showing the openness of European external borders as the way of horizontal 
communication and coordination have been materialised through different institutional set-ups in 
order to implement the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: the EU-Ukraine Summit, the 
Association Council and the Parliamentary Association Committee. The Summit is at the highest 
level of meetings on political agenda between the Ukrainian president and the President of the 
European Council; the Association Council refers to the ministerial meetings between the Ukrainian 
Prime Minister and the EU’s High Representative/Vice President of the European Commission to 
take binding decisions; the Parliamentary Association Committee is a platform for the EU and 
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Ukrainian parliamentarians to exchange views (EEAS, 2015). The institutional set-ups show that 
Ukraine has been included in the European open borders through cross-border cooperation.  
 
The cultural borders between the EU and Ukraine are constructed based on values including 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law (Dimitrovova B. , 2010). Ukraine is a case which shows 
the malleable nature of the European culture borders; the hard borders between the EU and Ukraine 
are constructed through different policy instruments including the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
Eastern Partnership and Association Agreement, manifesting the value-based cultural border 
construction. The dynamics between the European hard and soft borders constitute the degree of 
Europeanness and Eastness Ukraine possesses as both borders become more inclusive when Ukraine 
is more Europeanised due to the diffusion of EU values and adoption of EU laws and regulations.   
  
The Euro-Eastern ‘in-betweenness’ of Ukraine can be understood as the result of EU’s boundary-
drawing practices through Othering and how the EU identifies Ukraine as a country between ‘proper 
Europe’ and the East. Through the initiation of the European Neighbourhood Policy, proper Europe 
and the East were characterised as ‘cosmos’ and ‘chaos’ respectively, implying that European 
neighbourhood countries such as Ukraine are within the zone of chaos (Joenniemi, 2008). As defined 
previously, Ukraine, then, possesses ‘Eastness’ which symbolises backwardness and denotes what it 
means to be ‘quasi-European’ (Wolff, 1994). In this sense, Ukraine’s in-betweenness can be 
understood as the product of Europe’s spatial-temporal Othering through constructing Ukraine as 
Europe’s backward past and Europe’s non-EU neighbouring country.         
 
To conceptualise Ukraine’s ‘in-betweenness’, the term ‘identification’ instead of ‘identity’ has been 
used to understand how the EU identifies Ukraine as part of Eastern Europe. As previously defined, 
identification can be situational and contextual, showing that there are two modes of identification–
relational and categorical (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). In the case of Ukraine, the EU identifies 
Ukraine being relational with Russia and other Eastern European countries, whereas it categorically 
identifies Ukraine as a ‘neighbour’ as Ukraine shares attributes with other countries from the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. Other clusters of terms including ‘commonality’ and 
‘connectedness’ can also help understand how Ukraine shares common attributes with Europe while 
sharing the Communist past with other countries endowed with Eastness. Hence, Ukraine’s Eastness 
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can be understood through how the EU identifies Ukraine instead of analysing what Ukrainian 
identity is.  
 
In terms of Ukraine’s Europeanness and Eastness, it can be understood that Ukraine is the EU’s spatial 
Other as a neighbouring country, whereas Europe has been transformed by the inclusion of Central 
and Eastern European countries into a post-western shaped Europe (Delanty, 2007). Considering such 
inclusion shifted the generalised East to be closer to ‘proper Europe’, Ukraine would be more 
Europeanised with a lesser degree of Eastness due to the attraction of ‘being European’ which 
motivated Ukraine to be more aligned with the rest of EU member states (Arat-Koç, 2010) .  
 
Considering Ukraine’s endowment of Europeanness and Eastness as an Eastern European country 
which is closely tied with the Central and Eastern European countries within the generalised East, 
Ukraine is the best case in point to show the trajectory of Eastern European countries straddling 
between proper Europe and the generalised East at the expense of delineating themselves from being 
either fully European or fully Orientalised by the boundary-drawing practices of the EU officials. To 
produce meanings of Ukraine’s ‘in-betweenness’ for being European and Eastern simultaneously, the 
EU official discourses on Europe and Ukraine are needed in order to identify their discursive 
constructions as the result of different bordering practices within the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
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4. DISCOURSE, ITS THEORY, ANALYSIS AND DATA COLLECTION 
This section discusses the ontological understanding of discourse, five theoretical positions and the 
application of discourse analysis are used to materialize the above concepts.  
 
4.1. DISCOURSE  
A discourse is ‘a system producing a set of statements and practices that, by entering into institutions 
and appearing like normal, constructs the reality of its subjects and maintains a certain degree of 
regularity in a set of social relations’ (Dunn & Neumann, 2016, p. 4). 
 
Discourse produces meanings through representational practices, fixing certain forms of 
representations to disclose meanings and identities. A discourse theory adheres to the concept that 
the material world has no meaning itself; meanings are socially constructed through sign systems. 
Discourses define the authorities as subjects to speak and act (Milliken, 1999). It helps actors to make 
sense of the material world temporarily and act within the embedded meanings.  
 
Operated on several premises in terms of the relationship between language, agency and identity, this 
approach provides a ‘theoretically parsimonious and empirically grounded way’ (Epstein, 2010) to 
analyse identity formation with a clear illustration of main pitfalls of the concept of identity.  However, 
Epstein (2010) says that it does not make an assumption that states are the only actors to have a 
decisive role in shaping international politics. In particular, Epstein pointed out that language is 
assumed to be effective and making equivalence between speaking and acting; social actors are the 
same as speaking actors whose modality of agency and the way they position themselves are based 
on speaking; pre-existing discourses regulate actor behaviour in the context that discourses are the 
pre-conditions to act.   
 
In this vein, the meanings of border’, ‘Europeanness’ and ‘Eastness’ are produced and reproduced 
both by the EU Commissioners’ statements and in the course of the implementation of European 
Neighbourhood Policy. These meanings are normalised through repetition of EU official statements 
and silencing the alternative articulations by ignoring them, thus constructing European external 
borders through Othering Ukraine as an Eastern European country. Studying the EU official discourse 
on Ukraine gives a more comprehensive understanding of the paradoxical nature of European borders. 
To be specific, the EU official discourse on Ukraine limits how the EU Commissioners define the 
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degree of Europeanness and Eastness of Ukraine with respective policy implications including the 
extent of Ukraine’s participation of different fields of EU policies. It also gives an effective way of 
analysing the formation of European collective identity as a result of boundary-drawing practices, as 
well as how the East-West liminality of Ukraine was constructed by the EU Commissioners.  
 
4.2. DISCOURSE THEORY  
To theorize how the European borders’ dynamics of openness and closure constitute the paradoxical 
nature of borders through differentiating Europeanness and Eastness by implementing European 
Neighbourhood Policy in three periods, five theoretical positions are offered by Torfing (2005) to 
substantiate different discursive constructions of Europe as subject and Ukraine as object within the 
EU official discourses.  
 
Generally speaking, discourse theory offers ‘an analytical perspective which focuses on the rules and 
conditions that condition the construction of social, political and cultural identity’ (Torfing, 2005, p. 
1); it is an attempt to ‘describe, understand, and explain how and why particular discursive formations 
were constructed, stabilised, and transformed’ (ibidem, P.19). Such analytical perspective gives five 
discourse theoretical positions regarding the starting points of a post-structuralist discourse analysis.  
 
The first starting point is that a post-structuralist discourse theory asserts that there is such 
independent existence of reality from people’s consciousness, thoughts and language (ibidem). In 
other words, this theory does not necessarily lead to idealism, though it presupposes the discursive 
character of all social meanings and identities. Torfing (2005) implies that there is a tendency for the 
discursive construction of certain matters to be strengthened through certain forms of subjectivities 
throughout the process of discursive signification. In this way, discursive forms actively construct the 
objects which they signify, even though the meaningful object constructed by the discourses is 
affected by dislocation and social antagonism at a regular basis. Therefore, this discourse theory 
subscribes the materialist stance that between form and matter lies an irreducible distance (ibidem).  
 
Another discourse theoretical position asserts that any extra-discursive truth, morality, or ethics does 
not exist (Rorty, 1989). There are always a set of determinate values embedded into a particular 
discourse which gives everyone certain criteria to make value judgements. Given that all discourses 
are always contested and contaminated due to their continuous change of boundaries (Torfing, 2005), 
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it is possible to condition truth claims within a particular discursive framework within which “we 
define and negotiate our criteria for accepting something as true, right, or good (ibidem, P.19)”. 
 
This version of discourse theory also asserts that it does not just understand social phenomena, but 
also explains them through contextualising certain historical conditions as discourses emerge. Whilst 
opposing the causal explanations of social phenomena of which universal laws are claimed to be 
created (Torfing, 2005), the notions of ‘understanding’ and ‘explanation’ are not completely opposed 
with one another; initial understanding is always needed as a prerequisite of an explanation and an 
explanation aims at completing our understanding of certain matters (ibidem).  
 
The fourth discourse theoretical position holds that one can give critiques to the discourse one is 
analysing (Torfing (2005). While all ethical and normative claims can be deconstructed, it is still 
possible to give critiques through taking the form of ‘an attempt to deconstruct the closure invoked 
by ethical, normative, political, cultural, economic and other discourses’ (ibidem, P.20). An internal 
critique can be given by pointing out that the binary hierarchies of the text are problematic in terms 
of the non-totalizable openness.  
 
The last position concerns the anti-essentialist claim of  discourse theory. When discourse theorists 
assert that there is no essence, it means ‘the metaphysical idea of a positively defined essence that is 
given in and by itself’ (Torfing, 2005, p. 21). In other words, there is no such performative 
contradiction in discourse theory since this anti-essentialist claim does not imply determinate effects 
produced by social identities.  
 
The above positions give a firm ground to the theoretical framework of how Europe and Ukraine are 
discursively constructed by the EU Commissioners within their official statements and speeches. As 
all values are embedded into a particular discourse (Torfing, 2005), value-based concepts including 
‘border’, ‘Europeanness’ and ‘Eastness’ can be deconstructed as the social meanings of these 
concepts and identities are discursive in character. The anti-essentialist stand of discourse theory also 
gives room to identify different constructions of Europe and Ukraine so that discourses on Europe 
and Ukraine help us to understand and explain how European borders are discursively constructed in 
a paradoxical way through differentiating different gradients of Europeanness and Eastness.  
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4.3. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS  
To connect the above theoretical framework and concepts of border, Europeanness and Eastness, 
discourse analysis has been applied as the main method to examine how European external borders 
are constructed through Europe and its constitutive East in the case of Ukraine. This section gives a 
brief overview of discourse analysis, followed by a two-step approach of one version of Foucauldian 
discourse analysis in the following sub-section to make it feasible to analyse the relationship between 
borders, identities and Self-Other interactions in the case of Ukraine.  
 
Analysing a discourse requires an examination of how the material world appears the way it does and 
how particular actions become possible. Multiple sources are needed to analyse a discourse because 
one single source alone is not enough for empirical arguments (Milliken, 1999).  
 
A post-structuralist discourse analysis based on a constructivist understanding of the reality in social 
science will be applied to access social life through discourses. This approach holds an ontological 
point of view that discourse gives meanings to the material world, and it also means that it is possible 
to create, reproduce and change the structure using a language (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002).  
 
4.3.1. FOUCAULDIAN DISCROUSE ANALYSIS 
Foucault’s approach to discourse emphasises on ‘the use of concepts of discontinuity, rupture, 
threshold, limit, series, and transformation’ (Foucault, 1972, p. 31) in order to illustrate how 
statements are related with one another. However, considering that Foucault’s work rather focused 
on exploring how language and subjectivity are related within the context of psychological research, 
therefore an adopted version of Foucauldian discourse analysis was applied in this thesis to offer 
clearer methodological applications of his theory.  
 
This adopted version of Foucauldian discourse analysis concerns the relationship between discourse, 
practices and the material world; the social processes of legitimation and power are also its focuses 
(Willig, 2001). From this perspective, the epistemological understanding of discourses is that they 
allow and disable the matters being said by whom, where and when (Parker, 1992). According to 
Willig, this variation of discourse analysis to explore how the discourse’s objects and subjects are 
constructed involves two stages which help illustrate some of the implications of practice from the 
concerned discourse.  
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The first stage is to identify how the discursive object is constructed in the text. Willig (2001) suggests 
that this stage of analysis focuses on identification of how the object is discursively constructed in 
different ways. Instead of looking for keywords, it is recommended that all forms of reference to the 
object must be highlighted. An analysis on these different constructions is then carried out to compare 
different discourses within the same discursive object.   
 
The next stage is about the examination of functions and the relevance of different constructions to 
understand the discursive contexts shown by various constructions of the discursive object. These 
issues are linked to action orientation, the key to understand the achievements of the discursive 
object’s different constructions. Within particular discourses, some forms of behaviours are 
legitimised as the practices of given discourse, thereby explaining the conditions of such behaviours 
based on the production of knowledge through discourse analysis.   
 
To contextualise the stages of analysis, segments of EU official statements related to the concepts of 
Europeanness, Eastness as well as border will be highlighted in different ways according to the 
discursive objects the EU Commissioner addressed; in this sense, the meanings of these concepts will 
be constructed according to the highlighted segments within the selected timeframes during the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (2004-2008), Eastern Partnership (2009-2011) as well as the 
Association Agreement (2012-2016). After identifying different constructions of Europeanness, 
Eastness and border, they will be compared and contrasted within each selected timeframe. To link 
the EU’s action orientation and the discursive constructions of the concepts above, different 
dimensions of the ENP, EaP and AA/DCFTA will be analysed to identify which particular discursive 
construction legitimises the action orientations. To reach the conclusion on discursive changes of 
different constructions of the above concepts, each concept is divided into the following categories 
to ensure the discursive changes are comparable in different timeframes: for Europeanness, the 
relations between EU values and policies will be the only category for analysis; for Eastness, Europe’s 
spatial and temporal Otherings will be analysed; for border, the dynamics between the European hard, 
soft, open and close borders will be analysed as a whole.   
 
The above stages give sufficient foundations for delimiting the boundaries of discourses on European 
borders, so that it is possible to explore the relationship between different discursive constructions of 
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Europe in the case of Ukraine and the European Neighbourhood Policy systematically through 
identifying the changes of discourses on Europe and Ukraine during 2004-2016.  
 
4.3.2 DATA COLLECTION  
This section explains the process of data collection to give empirical findings for this Master’s thesis. 
Referring to the two-stage approach of Foucauldian discourse analysis explained above, all forms of 
reference to ‘Europeanness’, ‘Eastness’, and ‘border’ are highlighted in the collected statements and 
speeches from the EU Commission Press Release Database, so that the discursive meanings of Europe 
and Ukraine are to be discussed to understand and explain the paradox of European borders.  
 
Due to linguistic limitations, while there are official speeches and statements in French and German, 
only texts written in English will be analysed to ensure meanings are not lost in translation. To ensure 
sufficient materials are collected to analyse how Ukraine is constructed as a discursive object, 
understand the discursive construction of Europe and changes of European external borders 
throughout out different periods of the implementations and advancements of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, 168 official texts are searched by the policy area ‘European Neighbourhood 
policy and Enlargement Negotiation’ categorised by the EU Commission in order to identify different 
discourses within the this area. To better differentiate the changes of EU official discourses, these 
texts are further divided into three periods to illustrate the discursive boundaries through different 
policy instruments implemented by the EU Commission, namely the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (70 speeches and statements), Eastern Partnership (36 speeches and statements) and the 
Association Agreement (62 speeches and statements) periods.  
 
The selected timeframe of the official texts is limited between 2004 and 2016, since the year of 2004 
was the beginning of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The timeframe of data collection ends in 
2016. Throughout the EU-Ukraine Summits from 2016 to 2019, these high-level political dialogues 
produced repeated discourses on Russian annexation of Crimea, Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity as the European Council’s President Donald Tusk made similar remarks 
(Tusk, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019), which were semantically the same and hence it would be counter-
productive to study these identical statements within this period. Within this context, the EU 
Commission’s official search engine was used, and only statements and speeches mentioned 
‘Ukraine’ filtered by the official category of policy area ‘European Neighbourhood Policy and 
Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR)’ were used as data.    
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The speakers who made these statements and speeches were the leaders of the EU Commission and 
other Commissioners who were responsible for the EU Enlargement and European Neighbourhood 
Policy during the time frame of data collection, namely Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Olli Rehn, Peter 
Mandelson, José Manuel Durão Barroso, Margot Wallström, Štefan Füle, Catherine Ashton, 
Johannes Hahn and Jean-Claude Juncker.   
 
The EU Commission has been selected as the source for official discourse analysis due to the roles 
and functions of this institution that represents the EU’s interests. The Commission proposes and 
enforces legislation in order to promote the interest of the EU; it also enacts the decisions endorsed 
by the European Parliament which represents the European citizens and the Council of the EU which 
represents the interest of the EU member state’s government. Officially, the Commission represents 
the EU at the international arena and it is the legitimate institution that speaks on behalf of the EU 
member countries in international organisations as well as negotiate international agreements for the 
EU in order to protect the interests of the EU itself. Taking into consideration that the Commission 
consists of 28 Commissioners who represent all EU countries equally, when a Commissioner talks 
about Ukraine within the policy area of the European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement 
Negotiations, his/her speech represents the official EU position instead of the position of a particular 
EU country. While whether the EU’s actorness is still questionable in certain policy areas, this is not 
the focus of the thesis and what matters the most here is that the relation between the EU official 
discourses on Ukraine and the execution of EU external policy can be observed through analysing 
how the European external borders are constructed. Only by focusing on one particular institution of 
the EU, one can then isolate other external factors such as how the debates in the European Parliament 
is determined by party politics and national interests often take over during the political dialogues at 
the Council level.  
 
The above data collection process implies that this is a qualitative analysis which focuses on the 
production of meanings to understand and explain how different discursive constructions of Europe 
and Ukraine are manifested through different periods of the European Neighbourhood Policy.  
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5. DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF EUROPE  
In this section of discourse analysis, any statement from a part of a sentence to a longer text related 
to the concepts of ‘Europeanness’, ‘Eastness’ and ‘border’ will be used as an analytical unit to identify 
different discursive constructions of Europe and Ukraine during the following periods: ‘European 
Neighbourhood Policy and “The Big Bang” (2004-08)’, ‘Eastern Partnership (2009-11)’ and 
‘Association Agreement/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (2012-16)’.  
 
The periodisation of the above policies is based on the official launches of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 (EU Neighbourhood Info Center, 2015) and the Eastern Partnership 
in  2009 (EEAS, 2017), as well as the initiation of the official text of the EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement in 2012 (European Commission, 2013). 
 
While the dynamics of openness and closure of European borders differentiate Europeanness and 
Eastness, these categories have to be precisely defined for better analysis: ‘Europeanness’ refers to 
the degree of capacity to establish universal moral standards within a prosperous capitalist 
contemporary space (Manners, 2002) ; ‘Eastness’ is the reference to the insecure periphery of Europe 
which is the opposite end of the continuum against Europeanness (Kuus, 2007); for ‘border’, it refers 
to the product of human agency with hard, soft, open and closed lines of separation or contact in terms 
of  political institutions, culture, interconnections between regional boundaries as well as transitions 
of political regime (Delanty 2003, 2006; Dimitrovova, 2010).  
 
Taking into account  that the EU official discourses construct the meanings of ‘Europe’ and ‘Ukraine’ 
by producing statements and speeches in order to enter into EU institutions, the references of 
‘Europeanness’, Eastness’ and ‘border’ within the texts can be understood and explained by analysing 
segments of statements related to these concepts during the aforementioned periods in order to 
identify the changes of discursive constructions of Europe and Ukraine.  
 
5.1. EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY AND ‘THE BIG BANG’ 
ENLARGEMENT (2004-08)  
5.1.1. EUROPEANNESS 
Within the EU’s discursive constructions on Europe and Ukraine, political stability and democratic 
legitimacy were the main references of Europeanness from 2004 to 2008. ‘Political stability’ referred 
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to the regime change in Ukraine due to the presidential election scandal in 2004. The EU 
Commissioners’ discourses on the political situation in Ukraine in 2004 legitimized the EU to make 
speeches and statements to call for a reform-friendly political regime in Ukraine, which was relevant 
to the construction of European external borders as the borders were shifted eastwards after the EU 
enlargement in 2004. The second discursive construction ‘democratic legitimacy’ referred to the EU’s 
democratic mandate for EU citizens when new rounds of enlargement were involved; categorising 
Ukraine as the neighbour instead of candidate country did not involve democratic legitimacy to 
change the EU institutions, thereby differentiating non-EU countries with different statuses as 
boundary-drawing practice.       
 
The discursive constructions of Europeanness as political stability and democratic legitimacy 
condition the EU-Ukraine Action Plan as action orientation. The Action Plan included ‘partial 
integration of our partners into the EU Internal Market, a gradual participation in the so-called ‘four 
freedoms’ of the EU…the question of Ukrainian entry into the EU is not on the agenda. But it is clear 
that we are not closing any doors’ (Ferrero-Waldner B. , Situation in Ukraine, 2004). Europeanness, 
in this sense, emphasised more on restoring political stability in the ENP countries such as Ukraine 
instead of diffusing democracy, human rights and the rule of law through absorbing these countries 
into the EU.  
 
Another dimension of political stability referred to the need of peace for Ukraine as one of the EU’s 
immediate neighbourhoods. Within this discourse, being European meant that one would be capable 
to ‘handle the challenges of security and stability in our immediate neighbourhood’ (Ferrero-Waldner 
B. , 2005), which implied security and stability were the values the EU wanted to diffuse through its 
neighbourhood. In this sense, peace was also necessary for the EU to guarantee such pursue of these 
goals towards its bordering countries ‘should not be a tug of war between East and West’ (Ferrero-
Waldner B. , 2004). As the Ukrainian presidential crisis loomed in 2004, the ‘recognition of the new 
political reality in Ukraine’(Ferrero-Waldner B. , Remarks to Foreign Affairs Committee, 2004) 
referred to the regime change in Ukraine as Viktor Yushchenko became the president of Ukraine and 
the EU’s action orientation of engaging in the Ukrainian crisis was constructed as ‘a very positive 
role on assisting the country(Ukraine) to overcome the crisis last year’(ibidem) , implying that the 
EU was capable of helping its immediate neighbours to uphold EU values by putting them into 
practice such as holding free and fair elections.  
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Europeanness was constructed as democratic legitimacy which constituted external actions on its 
immediate neighbourhood in order to be the moral leader which can export EU values and include its 
neighbours to be part of the European civilisation borders. Given that both enlargement and 
neighbourhood policies were effective in projecting European values and interests in different ways, 
enlargement was the core of the EU’s soft power to ensure there would be not visible definition of 
the ‘borders of Europe’ (Rehn, 2006). In this vein, Europe needed to be open while keeping its 
consolidated enlargement agenda in place. Such democratic legitimacy could also be found in the 
construction of the ENP as a policy ‘all about practical progress, not about theoretical institutional 
questions’ (Ferrero-Waldner B. , 2006). Such practical progress manifested the open structure of 
European external borders as the inclusion of horizontal communication and coordination 
(Dimitrovova B. , 2010).   
 
On the other hand, Europeanness as democratic legitimacy conditioned further cross-border 
cooperation between the EU and its neighbours through interconnections between regional 
boundaries and overlapping networks (Dimitrovova B. , 2010); this performance-driven ENP policy 
asserted the EU as a ‘great transformational power’ (Ferrero-Waldner B. , 2007) which would 
intensify the results with more economic components. The then EU Commissioner for Enlargement 
Olli Rehn (2008) echoed the notion of EU as a transformation power with the case of Ukraine which 
moved on with a Eastern dimension to negotiate a ‘New Enhanced Agreement including on a deep 
and comprehensive Free Trade Area’ (ibidem); Ukraine was an illustration to show how an ENP 
country could be guided to the European track of reforms. Hence, this discursive construction of 
Europeanness projected EU values to its neighbours at the expense of Eastness, changing the 
equilibrium of Europeanness and Eastness in non-EU Eastern European countries. 
 
In summary, during the first period of timeframe, ‘Europeanness’ was discursively constructed as 
‘political stability’ and ‘democratic legitimacy’ in order to legitimise the EU to call for a EU-friendly 
Ukrainian government as well as the construction of new borders between the Central and Eastern 
European countries as well as Eastern European countries after the enlargement.     
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5.1.2. EASTNESS  
Europe’s temporal and spatial Others as well as juxtapositions of EU values were the main discursive 
constructions of Ukraine in sense of Eastness. Non-EU countries were constructed as Europe’s spatial 
Other in a bid to draw the lines of separation between the EU countries and their non-EU partners 
along the European hard borders; post-Soviet countries were not fully endowing Europeanness as the 
EU claimed that they had a choice to align themselves between the EU and Russia  (Ferrero-Waldner 
B. , 2005). Regarding Europe’s temporal Other, post-war Europe was mentioned to legitimize the 
necessity for the neighbouring countries to integrate with proper Europe through political and 
economic reforms. As for the last discursive construction, corruption, cronyism and authoritarianism 
were the juxtapositions of EU values in terms of Eastness.  
 
Adopting the previous conceptualisation of Eastness, Russia was constructed as the backward version 
of ‘Europe’ which is often referred to the ‘East’ (Eder, 2006). In the beginning years of the 
establishment of the ENP, Eastness and Europeanness stood for different degrees of reforms needed 
but they were not necessarily mutually exclusive and they could co-exist.  ‘We agreed with the 
Russian authorities that…we can work together to help promote stability and prosperity in countries 
like Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, without forcing them to choose one camp or the other’ (Ferrero-
Waldner B. , 2005). But the coverage of countries with Eastness was not limited to post-Soviet and 
post-Communist countries–the EU Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner framed the ENP as a ‘Pan-
European’ policy that ranged ‘from Eastern Europe through the Caucasus and the Middle East to the 
Maghreb’ (ibidem). Taking the logic of Eastness as a continuum, the closer an ENP country related 
with the EU, the lower the degree of Eastness it possessed, then the case of Ukraine showed that its 
Europeanness was higher than its Eastness than other ENP countries as ‘Ukraine clearly has an 
“avant-garde status” within the ENP’ (Ferrero-Waldner B. , Quo vadis Europa, 2005).  
 
Europe’s temporal other was manifested by mentioning the Cold War and Velvet Revolution as well 
as the fall of Berlin Wall (Rehn, Enlargement in the evolution of the European Union, 2006). Not 
only did the historical references depict the source of Eastness, but they also constructed how Eastness 
was characterised by European integration. “Then the Berlin Wall came down. The EU started the 
21st century as a very different community from the one of the Cold War era...the era that began in 
1989 as the second great transformation of post-war Europe, following the first transformation after 
the Second World War, when European integration was established” (ibidem). This logic of temporal 
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Othering depicted how Europe’s Self was constructed through identifying its own past as the 
constitutive Other (Prozorov, 2010), preventing the Self to repeat these historical events to become 
concurrent events in contemporary Europe.  
 
In the same vein, the backwardness of Eastness was also discursively constructed as corruption, 
cronyism and authoritarianism, juxtaposing the EU values of democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law. Ferrero-Waldner (2006) stated that the post-communist region co-inhabit with the European 
continent and Ukraine should be assured that the EU will be with Ukraine every step of the way 
(ibidem). Russia was also mentioned as a significant post-Communist country as a parameter of 
Eastness as the Commissioner stated that ‘of course in speaking about the post-Communist countries 
we must talk about Russia’ (ibidem, p. 5). Generally speaking, Eastness was constructed as the legacy 
of communism (ibidem) which was still ‘constrained by Soviet-era practices, extensive, corrupt 
bureaucracies, and top-down patronage networks’ (ibidem, p. 6). The EU used enlargement to absorb 
shock for Europe (Rehn, 2006) as a response of the collapse of communism, attempting to extend the 
area which entails peace, liberty and democracy(ibidem).  
 
Eastness was, then, discursively constructed as Europe’s temporal Other in terms of the Cold War, 
Velvet Revolution as well as the fall of Berlin Wall, whereas Europe’s spatial Other was another 
discursive construction of Eastness as the partnership with Russia. Both constructions legitimised the 
EU’s discourse on corruption, cronyism and authoritarianism as post-Soviet legacy which needed to 
be transformed into EU values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law through implementing 
the Action Plan of each ENP country.  
 
5.1.3 BORDER 
The discursive constructions of border can be broken down into three dimensions as conceptualised 
previously regarding the dynamics of openness and closure of European external borders (Delanty, 
2006): the first dimension concerns the hard borders constituted by the EU political institutions; the 
second is about the territorial borders which were functioned to protect EU citizens; the last 
dimension emphasises how the dynamics between widening and deepening of the EU constitute 
cultural borders.  
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The European hard borders were discursively constructed as political institutions beyond a EU 
membership. While the conditions for joining the EU were unambiguous and clear-cut, this 
dimension of Othering appeared to follow the logic that the layers of European hard border are 
threefold: the non-EU neighbours first had to participate in political cooperation as long as the EU 
desired, then these neighbours had to fulfil all the reform requirements envisaged by the EU, followed 
by further negotiations on EU accession if it was within the EU’s interests.    
 
In this case, the ENP aimed at inviting non-EU neighbours to the East and to the South to share peace, 
stability and prosperity defined by the EU (Ferrero-Waldner B. , 2004). From a broader perspective, 
while the Commissioner defined what the ENP was and what it was not, it was ambiguous regarding 
whether the EU would accept the ENP countries if they applied for the EU membership. She claimed 
that the EU would not reject the ENP countries to accede the EU, but the ENP would not provide an 
accession prospect either (ibidem). The differentiation between ‘being European’ and ‘becoming 
European’ was seen as the participation in all these activities (TEMPUS programme, Erasmus 
Mundus programme, the European Training Foundation), which were financed by the EU, drew the 
region closer to the EU.  
 
The above case of ENP countries’ policy participation offered a clear and tangible European 
perspective (Ferrero-Waldner B. , 2005)  to keep them away from the EU but at the same time brought 
them closer to the EU. The Commissioner also explicitly stated that the possibility of applying for 
EU membership was a distraction from the real issue in the neighbourhood (Ferrero-Waldner B. , The 
EU and Ukraine-what lies beyond the horizon?, 2005), and Ukraine had the duty to ‘consolidate its 
democratic and economic transitions, both of which are necessary before EU membership becomes 
an option’ (ibidem). It indicated that the hard political border of EU was not completely closed 
throughout this period of the ENP. Ferrero-Waldner (2005) stated during the signature of EU-
Moldova-Ukraine Memorandum of Understanding, the ENP gave “real benefits to Europeans both 
inside and outside the EU”, or in other words, the ENP as an action orientation was an inclusive 
policy which did not exclude the ENP countries from joining the EU. Therefore, the boundary 
between Europe and its neighbours was created based on what the policy offered but not the exact 
statuses of the ENP countries as compared to those Central and Eastern European countries which 
joined the EU in 2004.  
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While the discursive constructions of border  differentiated into three dimensions, it did not annihilate 
the meaning of border itself, “because borders matter––not as a way of defining ourselves, but 
because they are key to many of our citizens’ urgent concerns––security, migration, and economic 
growth…borders are not only about protecting our citizens, but also breaking down barriers between 
peoples and cultures (Ferrero-Waldner B. , The Euroepan Neighbourhood Policy: helping ourselves 
through helping our neihgbours, 2005)”. The emphasis of European hard borders was illustrated 
through a remark on the fact that there was no discussion of EU membership with the ENP countries 
as a response on their desire for deepening relations with the EU (ibidem). In spite of the hardness of 
European borders, these borders were still porous and malleable due to the uncertain paths the EU 
had set the ENP countries in; Ferrero-Waldner claimed that borders mattered less and there was a 
need of ‘opening ourselves up’ (Quo vadis Europa, 2005), but every political Union had borders and 
the geographical change was not possible for the EU (ibidem).    
 
The soft and close natures of cultural and territorial borders were discursively constructed as widening 
and deepening European political integration. While widening and deepening political integration 
within and around Europe were widely seen as dichotomous, this notion was rejected by the EU 
official (Rehn, Enlargement in the evolution of the European Union, 2006).   
 
The construction of EU borders were based on the differentiation between how the political borders 
had been changed before and after the enlargement whereas the values shaped Europe remained the 
same before and after the change of its borders. “The rule of law, respect for human rights and 
democracy and good governance, is as valid today as 60 years ago. But physically the EU looks very 
different even compared to 18 months ago”, Ferrero-Waldner (2005) stated at the Conference of 
Foreign Affairs Committee Chairmen of EU member and candidate states. While the enlargement 
process was considered to unify the European continent within historical context (ibidem), the 
intertwining feature of Europe’s hard political border and soft cultural border was shown to be 
mutually constitutive since the change of EU political institutions is affected by the discursive 
practices on shared values between the EU and its neighbours, whereas these values have to be 
legitimised by the EU political institutions through action orientations.   
 
This section highlighted the European hard, soft and close borders as three dimensions of the 
discursive constructions; the hard borders were constructed as the political cooperation between EU 
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and non-EU countries as the prerequisite for further European integration, while both soft and close 
borders were constructed as the dynamics between widening and deepening European integration. 
The discourse on hard borders legitimised the EU to delineate non-EU neighbouring countries from 
being part of ‘proper Europe’, while the discourse of soft and close borders legitimise the separation 
between Central and Eastern European countries and Eastern European countries.  
5.2. EASTERN PARTNERSHIP (2009-11) 
5.2.1 EUROPEANNESS  
The discursive constructions of Europeanness were changed from political stability and democratic 
legitimacy to pragmatism and economic freedom as the European Neighbourhood Policy 
differentiated to Eastern Partnership which focused on six post-Soviet countries with a regional 
agenda. During this period, Europeanness was understood as the adoption of a range of EU laws, 
regulations and reforms through institution building; the discourse on pragmatism was about showing 
the results of the reforms agreed between the EU and an Eastern Partnership country rather than 
making statements and speeches about the reforms. The second discursive construction on economic 
freedom concerns the financial incentives which would be delivered to the EaP countries once their 
reforms plans were fully implemented.  
 
The introduction of Eastern Partnership was a change of discursive practice from encouraging 
reforms in the EU’s immediate neighbouring countries to build new institutions through an ambitious 
programme  (Ferrero-Waldner B. , 2009). The notion of projecting European values into the European 
neighbourhood was no longer implemented by encouraging the political decision-makers but 
manifested by institutionalization through Eastern Partnership. The repeated statements of demanding 
Ukraine that reform needed to be done decisively (Füle, 2010). It implied that being European also 
meant the EU had to ensure Ukraine implement all the necessary reforms, including ‘getting Ukraine 
back on track with IMF’, ‘reforming the gas sector with a view to inclusion in the Energy Community’, 
‘addressing gaps in the migration control system’, as well as ‘approximating trade related legislation 
to conclude the Association Agreement, including DCFTA’ (ibidem, p. 3). This discourse on 
pragmatism corresponds with the concept of the openness of borders which is understood as a 
malleable structure being responsive to changes (Delanty, 2006); only technical details such as 
trading and visa were emphasized.  
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Another discursive construction of Europeanness concerns with economic freedoms. Füle (2010) 
highlighted that many of the ENP counties were ‘obvious trading partners’ due to geographic 
proximity as he addressed what Eastern Partnership meant for EU businesses. Technicalities of the 
progress of Ukraine as Eastern partner were explicitly re-stated such as trade liberalisation and the 
visa dialogue (Füle, Address to AFET Committee, 2010). The proposal of the DCFTA and the 
enhanced co-operation in different sectors from public health to the environment(ibidem), as well as 
the illustration of reforms’ technical details and cooperation substantiated the characteristics of 
Europeanness throughout the period of Eastern Partnership. With the establishment of the European 
External Action Service enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty, more interested-oriented approaches were 
mentioned in the EaP including the importance of taking a small leap in order to gain immediate and 
tangible benefits, as well as the financial contribution from other European financial institutions. The 
implications of ‘going further’ were that there would be more financial support for further 
Europeanisation if more reforms were envisaged by the Ukrainian government. Hence, the EU’s 
action orientation of giving financial incentives to the EaP countries to implement reforms was 
conditioned by the pre-existing discourse on democratic legitimacy during the ENP period.  
 
The discursive constructions of Europe and Ukraine in terms of Europeanness changed from 
democratic values and political interests to technicalities of reforms and economic interests whereas 
the EU changed its action orientation from the ENP to EaP. These discursive constructions showed 
that the European hard and open borders predominated its soft (cultural) and close (territorial or 
civilizational) borders. The open structure of European external borders defined the meanings of 
Europeanness through technical talks between the EU and a non-EU third country.   
 
During this period, pragmatism and economic freedom were the main discursive constructions of 
Europeanness; the former referred to the adoption of EU laws and regulations, while the latter referred 
to partial access of European Single Market for the EU neighbours. Both of the discursive 
constructions legitimised the EU’s emphasis on technical requirements of EU neighbours to envisage 
reforms in order to gain economic benefits as incentives.  
 
5.2.2. EASTNESS 
Considering the Eastern Partnership was about technicalities and economic freedom as mentioned 
above, there were similar patterns observed regarding Europe’s temporal and spatial Others, and the 
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juxtapositions of EU values as the discursive constructions of Ukraine’s Eastness. After the political 
and economic reforms envisaged during 2004-08, Ukraine’s values were no longer referred to the 
post-Soviet legacy of political practices including corruption, cronyism and authoritarianism; 
Eastness was addressed as the deficiency of Europeanness which conditioned the EU to 
institutionalize this deficiency and tailor-make reform agenda with each Eastern Partnership country. 
The spatial and temporal Otherings were discursively constructed as Russia’s East and the fall of 
Berlin Wall; the former envisaged policies on the sphere of interest rejected by the EU while the latter 
depicted the opposite of construction of European external borders as there was no need for new 
political walls in Europe to replace the Berlin Wall (Rehn, 2009).  
 
The institutionalisation of the deficiency of Europeanness meant that the EaP was set up in order to 
address the political and economic shortcomings of all EaP countries with a specific focus; the new 
instruments dedicated to EaP countries only existed due to the lack of Europeanness in different 
aspects. For instance, Štefan Füle, the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood 
Policy, stated that ‘we should capitalise on the attractiveness of our regulatory environment and 
expand the area where EU rules are applied’ (2010, p. 2). While the EaP programme was presented 
as an option, this instrument defined the relations between the EU and these EaP countries. “The 
further partners can go with their political and economic reform the further the EU will respond 
through enhanced political association and further economic integration’ (ibidem). In this sense, 
Eastness was not a mere recessive characteristic which was defined by Europe as the moral leader on 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law; quite the contrary, as the case of Ukraine suggested, 
the progress of Europeanness and the decline of Eastness were up to Ukraine’s commitment to adhere 
these values to “ultimately define how close the EU and Ukraine come together (Füle, 2010)”.  
 
The discursive constructions of Eastness as spatial and temporal Otherings of Europe changed 
partially. On one hand, the European external borders were constructed as what was opposite against 
the Berlin Wall; on the other hand, Russia’s policy on the sphere of interest was constructed as the 
juxtaposition of what European integration meant. “We don’t need new political walls in Europe to 
replace the walls of concrete that fell 20 years ago. This would go against everything the EU stands 
for. That is why our new Eastern Partnerships, e.g. with Ukraine, are so important in bringing these 
countries closer to the EU and refusing any spheres of interest” (Rehn, 2009). The remark on 
‘Russia’s return to a policy of sphere of interest in Eastern Europe’(ibidem) confronted the EU’s 
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previous discourse on Eastness during the initial ENP period(2004-08) when the EaP was not yet 
instrumentalised. In other words, instead of categorising all Eastern Partnership countries as the full 
possession of the Eastness, the EU’s reckoning of “Eastness” was, therefore, Russia.  
 
During the Eastern Partnership period, Eastness was discursively constructed as the deficiency of 
Europeanness which bordered  Russia as the spatial and temporal Other. This construction legitimised 
the EU to implement the Eastern Partnership programme to the post-Soviet countries surrounding the 
EU, thereby making these post-Soviet countries more Europeanised at the expense of Eastness.  
 
5.2.3. BORDER  
The European hard, soft and closed borders were the main dimensions of discursive constructions 
during 2009-11. While the hard borders and the logic of closure (Delanty, 2003) excluded Eastern 
Partnership countries to be part of ‘proper Europe’, the discourse on soft borders categorised post-
Communist and post-Soviet countries to be part of the same ‘civilizational constellation’(ibidem, p.14) 
as they both shared the history of the fall of Berlin Wall while they were under the rule of totalitarian 
regimes. The hard border was constructed within the same civilizational constellation as the EU post-
Communist countries bordered with non-EU post-Soviet countries.  
  
The construction of European external border emphasized more on the existing institutional borders 
between the EU and Ukraine as a non-EU country, albeit its categorization as ‘European country’ in 
cultural terms. “We seek to offer Ukraine and other countries close to our eastern borders new kinds 
of support, including in the field of energy…Ukraine will be a major player in the multilateral track 
of the partnership” (Ferrero-Waldner B. , 2009). In this vein, Europe’s external borders with Ukraine 
was explicit in terms of the hard institutional border. Štefan Füle (2010) highlighted that the EU and 
Ukraine share four common borders physically, and this geographical condition gave ground to why 
‘the EU and Ukraine are enormously important to each other’ (ibidem) and the mutual interest that 
drove the ‘natural and inevitable dynamic’ in EU-Ukraine relations. But the emphasis of the existing 
institutional borders was not equivalent to the permanent external borders of Europe.    
 
While the permanent borders have yet been set, the discursive construction of European soft borders 
was manifested by the historical parallel drawn between the Central and Eastern European countries 
and Ukraine, including Eastern Partnership countries into part of the European cultural borders 
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through shared history.  “Coming out from the Curtain, this was the magnetic pull that the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe responded to when they chose to join the EU…many of our Eastern 
neighbours––from Ukraine to the Southern Caucasus––have the same ambition to join one day” 
(Rehn, 2009). This recognition of historical similarities between Central and Eastern European 
countries as well as the EaP countries gives room to facilitate the openness of European external 
borders through identifying the sameness between part of the EU and all EaP countries. “The 
European Union has undergone extraordinary changes in the past 20 years. Its membership has 
enlarged beyond recognition to include countries from South, Central and Eastern Europe” (Füle, 
2010). On the other hand, Füle again referred to the historical moment ‘as the Iron Curtain opened, a 
whole new set of difficult questions were revealed, to be faced by governments, civil society and 
citizens in both the East and the West...reforms were needed first and how they could be implemented 
legitimately and effectively’ (The European Union and Eastern Europe: Post-Crisis Rapprochment?, 
2010).  
 
As the European cultural borders included the Eastern Partnership countries through similarities of 
historical narratives, the closure of European external border, however, drew upon different 
‘civilizational constellations’ (Delanty, 2003, p. 14); the differentiation of Europeanness and Eastness 
was constructed as the boundary between former-Soviet countries which were ruled under 
totalitarianism and the EU countries under democracies. The close European border with the East 
was constructed when Finland joined the EU in 1995. The EU downplayed the geographical location 
of Eastern Europe even though Europe’s past was constructed as a divisive Other which the Iron 
Curtain existed while the Europe at present does not distinguish where Eastern Europe starts and 
where it ends. Instead, Eastness was defined as the cultural, economic and political differences 
between the EU countries and its neighbours which struggled to reform. Following the logic of 
closure, this definition implies an unambiguous border between ‘proper Europe’ and ‘Eastern Europe’.    
 
This section also highlighted the European hard, soft and closed borders as three dimensions of the 
discursive constructions during the Eastern Partnership period; the hard borders were constructed as 
non-permanent existing institutional borders, the soft borders were constructed as the shared history 
between Central and Eastern European countries and Eastern European countries, and the closed 
borders were constructed as different sides of the Iron Curtain. In this sense, the construction of hard 
borders gave room for changes of institutional borders, the soft borders legitimised the EU 
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enlargement process , and the close borders conditioned the reforms in EaP countries to narrow down 
the differences between the EU and its EaP neighbours in cultural, economic and political terms.  
5.3. ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT/ DEEP AND COMPREHENSIVE FREE TRADE 
AREA (2012-16) 
5.3.1. EUROPEANNESS 
Moral leadership and economic development were the main discursive constructions of Europeanness 
during 2012-16. The former concerns Ukraine’s progress as the most Europeanized Eastern 
Partnership country which set an example for the rest of them, legitimizing the Association 
Agreements with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova; the latter emphasizes one of the main distinctive 
features to be ‘European’ is to enjoy economic prosperity as the case of Poland showed the merits of 
implementing necessary EU laws and regulations.    
 
The discourse on moral leadership was seen from how Europe positioned itself as the role model of 
modernity in the face of the ENP countries. “Ukraine will have our support in order not to deviate 
from its choice for long-term modernity and highest political and legal standards” (Füle, 2012). 
Europe’s role as a moral leader could be seen from the case of Ukraine as it also became another 
example for other Eastern European countries to follow its progress. “Ukraine has been a pilot case 
for solutions adopted later by other Eastern European Partners. For example, it was the first country 
to begin negotiations of the Association Agreement and to start implementing the Visa Liberalization 
Action Plan” (Füle, 2014), thereby showing the trait of being the moral leader of other non-EU 
neighbours which were put into the same category by the EU.  
 
Europeanness also assumed the superiority of Europe over its periphery. As EU positioned itself as 
the point of reference of solidarity and human rights, its engagement with the neighbourhood 
countries was not merely a choice but out of necessity. The degree of Europeanness referred to the 
extent which Europe helped fulfil the potential for holistic development of citizens in Eastern Europe, 
but not the US as a global power. “Europe must take its responsibilities in its own neighbourhood 
even more proactively. We should not count on others, from other continents, to solve our problems. 
If we want to demonstrate that the EU matters in the world, surely it is in our own backyard that we 
must begin” (Hahn, European Neighbourhood Policy Review, 2015). The discourse on moral 
leadership also coincided with Europeanness as a quality to be superior over Eastness.   
 
 41 
The discourse on economic prosperity referred to how Europeanness could be converted into 
measurable material interests to attract Eastern European countries to be more Europeanized. 
Ukraine’s past was temporally constructed as a version of Poland before accession in economic terms. 
It implied that even though Ukraine was categorized as part of ‘Eastern Europe’ and Poland was 
categorized as part of  ‘Central and Eastern Europe’, the starting points for both countries were the 
same. Europe was discursively constructed as the transformative power which could project its values 
into its neighbouring countries. “Poland itself is a good example of transformational power that 
Association Agreements between the European Union and Central and Eastern European countries 
had, back in the 90ies, well before these countries’ accession to the European Union…we believe the 
European past of Ukraine would bring progress of the kind that Europe has been able to support in 
countries like Poland” (Barroso, 2014). Europeanness as economic prosperity could also be seen from 
the EU’s reference on the economic performances of Poland and Ukraine in the 90s. “The GDP of 
Poland and Ukraine at the beginning of the 90s was more or less the same. Then Poland concluded 
similar kind of agreement we are offering to our partners now, and in a couple of years the difference 
in GDP has changed four times on the side of Poland” (Füle, Priorities for EU relations with the 
Eastern Partnership countries , 2014).  
 
During the Association Agreement period, Europeanness was discursively constructed as moral 
leadership and economic development; the former referred to Ukraine as the most progressive Eastern 
European country which had the highest political and legal standards, while the latter referred to the 
economic prosperity of Central and Eastern European countries before they joined the EU. The 
construction of moral leadership legitimise the implementation of Visa Liberalisation Action Plan, 
whereas the construction of economic prosperity conditioned the EU to envisage closer economic ties 
with Ukraine, namely the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.  
 
5.3.2. EASTNESS  
Russia as ‘the East’ and Europe’s spatial Other were the discursive constructions of Eastness during 
2012-16. The former concerns the mutual dependence between Russia and Ukraine in terms of Soviet 
legacy, while the latter emphasizes the EU enlargement process as a ‘reunion’ between the East and 
the West, in which the East did not refer to Russia but Eastern and Central Europe.   
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After two periods of Europeanisation (ENP during 2004-2008 and EaP during 2009-2011), Ukraine 
was still associated with the degree of Eastness it endowed during the Soviet period. Füle stated that 
‘we are talking about the transformation of Eastern Europe and we are talking about a country, a 
region, where, not a long time ago– and we all here remember this- a totalitarian regime reigned, the 
Soviet totalitarian regime to be more precise’ (2012). Within this context, the Soviet legacy of 
Ukraine was not entirely replaced by the fact that it has been part of the ENP since 2004. While the 
instruments have been changed from the EaP to the Association Agreement/Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA), Ukraine did not fully adhere to the European norms; the problems of 
selective justice, business climate and constitutional reforms which fell below the expectations of the 
EU. As the Ukrainian crisis broke out in 2014, there was a connotation between Ukraine’s Eastness 
as a EaP country and Russia’s Eastness as ‘the East’ due to its Soviet past like Ukraine, which showed 
the source of Eastness came from the Soviet past of Russia. “Ukraine needs Russia, and Russia needs 
Ukraine. Russia has a chance to become part of the efforts to bring stability and prosperity back to 
Ukraine, including being part of the coordinated international efforts to help Ukraine address its 
economic challenges” (Füle, 2014, p. 3). 
 
The logic of spatial Othering applied when the discursive construction of Eastness referred to the 
imaginary space which were ruled by totalitarian regimes under the Iron Curtain. The EU enlargement 
process was justified as a ‘reunion’ between the East and West after being split for decades, as ‘the 
accession of countries in Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 united East and West after decades of 
artificial separation, contributing to overall stability and security’ (Füle, Copenhagen accession 
criteria: 20 years that changed Europe, 2013), whereas the EU stated that one should not 
‘underestimate the difference between being part of the socialist camp and being part of the post-
Soviet Union: you have a different starting point’ (Füle, 2013). The difference between EaP countries 
and Central and Eastern European countries was highlighted as ascending gradient of Eastness from 
the Eastness of the former Socialist Republics to the post-Soviet Republics. 
 
Europe’s spatial Other as well as the mutual dependence between Russia and Ukraine were the 
discursive constructions of Eastness during the Association Agreement period; the former referred to 
a different version of ‘East’ which did not reunited with the EU’s ‘West’ during the enlargement 
process, while the latter referred to the common Soviet past between Russia and Ukraine. The 
construction of Europe’s spatial Other functioned to legitimise the fact that the Association 
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Agreement would not be the final destination in EU-Ukraine relations, whereas the mutual 
dependence conditioned the imposition of EU values towards Ukraine in terms of Ukrainian reforms. 
 
5.3.3. BORDER  
The predominant discursive construction of border concerns how the unambiguous European political 
borders would be permeable by the Eastern Partnership countries included in the European cultural 
borders with open structures. Considering these countries have been included in different dimensions 
of European external borders, the aforementioned discourses on Europeanness and Eastness during 
2012-16 showed that the boundary-drawing practices of Othering Russia as “the East” brought the 
Eastern Partnership countries closer to the EU. The paradoxical element of European external borders 
was, then, how these political borders were legitimized if they contradicted all other dimensions of 
border constructions.  
 
The hard political borders of Europe were not finalized but they were not softened to accommodate 
the advanced EaP countries either. “Ukraine’s European aspirations were ambitious and firm; that 
European integration will contribute to Ukraine’s reform and that its ultimate goal would be to belong 
to our family...I firmly believe that by strengthening its democracy, Ukraine can reach the ‘point of 
no return’ on its European Union path” (Füle, 2012). While the EU claimed that EU-Ukraine relations 
were the most advanced compared to the rest of the EaP countries, it expected that the “destination” 
of Ukraine would be the ‘European Union path’, paving the way for closer integration and association 
with the EU. The border existed, but it existed in the form of a hard political border which was only 
permeable for EU neighbour countries. In other words, the AA/DCFTA itself would not change the 
decision-making bodies of the EU, but this instrument would not exclude any possibility for the EaP 
countries with AA/DCFTA to apply for EU membership in the future.   
 
The European soft and close borders were found to be mutually constitutive as shown by the 
discursive construction of Europe. The EU’s boundary-drawing practice against Russia was 
constructed between the EU’s AA/DCFTA and Russia’s Commonwealth of Independent States Free 
Trade Area as Štefan Füle stated that ‘joining any structure which would imply transferring your own 
ability to set tariffs and define your own trade policy to a supranational body–would mean that 
Ukraine would no longer be able to implement the tariff dismantling agreed with the European Union 
in the context of the DCFTA’ (Füle, 2013). It meant that EaP countries including Ukraine were free 
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to join other supranational structures as long as it did not contradict the Association Agreement, but 
Russia’s Free Trade Area would be incompatible with the EU’s DCFTA. The concept of the Russia’s 
Free Trade Area, then, was mutually exclusive with that of the EU’s AA/DCFTA.  Therefore, Ukraine 
was constructed as a European country which was located within the European soft border as the EU 
expected it not to join Russia’s Free Trade Area which was not considered to be ‘European’.  
 
The physical boundaries between Russia and the EU’s EaP countries were constructed as the 
civilizational borders between Europe and non-Europe, thereby including the EaP countries into the 
same civilizational constellation with the post-Communist part of the EU. “Our Eastern Partnership 
policy and consensus on it ends on the borders of our Eastern neighbours with Russia” (Füle, 2014). 
The boundary-drawing practice did differentiate Russia and the rest of EU’s Eastern Partners, yet it 
did not differentiate its policies towards these countries as it stated ‘our policy vis-à-vis neighbours 
should be also a policy vis-à-vis neighbours of our neighbours’ (Füle, 2014). Therefore, Russia’s 
Customs Union was also seen by the EU as the boundary of Europe. “The Customs Union is a 
different project, from a different world” (Füle, 2014). 
 
The construction of European open borders conditioned how the European hard borders should be 
placed as the AA/DCFTA was constructed to be the closest instrument to the enlargement process.  
“Some partners in the east are embarking on ambitious association and deep trade agreements – and, 
although the scope of these has by far not been exhausted, already aspire to more, even to the 
perspective of EU membership in the very long term” (Hahn, European Neighbourhood Policy: the 
way forward, 2015). The function of constructing the open borders similarly to that of the hard 
borders was to maintain the connectedness and groupness between ‘proper Europe’, post-Communist 
part of Europe and the post-Soviet EaP countries to constitute European collective identity through 
‘the sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded, solidarity group’ (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, p. 20).  
 
The European hard borders were discursively constructed to be more inclusive as shown by the 
reference of the enlargement policy as the ‘most powerful transformative tool’ (Füle, 2014, p. 2). “If 
we want to be serious about the European aspirations of a number of our partners, then we have to 
use the most powerful transformative tool the European Union has at its disposal” (Füle, Presentation 
to AFET committee, 2014). This discursive construction conditioned further integration through 
imposing Europeanness on the EaP countries, thereby affirming that the AA/DCFTA is not a final 
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goal in the EU-Ukraine cooperation (Füle, New Europe and enlargement in a new political context , 
2014).  
 
During the Association Agreement period, the open, closed, soft and hard natures of border were the 
discursive constructions of border. The open and hard borders referred to European political borders 
which became more inclusive towards the EaP countries through loosening the boundaries between 
widening and deepening aspects of European integration; the soft and closed borders referred to the 
differentiation between Russia and EaP countries as different civilizational constellations. The 
construction of open and hard borders conditioned further European integration of Ukraine which 
could go beyond the instruments of the Association Agreement, whereas the construction of soft and 
closed borders legitimise the EU to draw a permanent border between Russia and the EaP countries.   
6. CONCLUSION  
In this thesis, three periods of the EU Commissioners’ discourses on Europe–the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership  and the Association Agreement (with Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area)–were analysed in the case of Ukraine. Only the statements and 
speeches within ‘European Neighbourhood policy and Enlargement negotiation’ were analysed. The 
aim for such selection was to understand and explain the complexity of European external borders 
through  on how the discursive construction of Europe was changed in terms of how ‘Europeanness’, 
‘Eastness’ and ‘border’ were understood by the EU Commissioners throughout different periods of 
EU neighbourhood policy. The findings show that the European external borders are paradoxical due 
to their dynamics among openness, closure, hard and soft affect the completion of construction of 
European permanent borders; the formation of European collective identity contradicts the very idea 
of the construction of European hard borders due to the constant changes of gradients of Europeanness 
and Eastness amongst EU and non-EU countries which are located in Europe in geographical terms.  
 
The discursive constructions of Europeanness were changed from political practices based on values 
including the rule of law, human rights and democracy throughout the European Neighbourhood 
Policy to European integration based on effective political reforms and economic development during 
the implementation of Association Agreement. During the first selected timeframe (2004-08), the 
case of Ukrainian presidential election scandal (Ferrero-Waldner B. , Situation in Ukraine, 2004) was 
constructed as the need for political stability in order to stabilize Europe’s political borders within the 
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discourse on political stability in Europe; another discursive construction of Europeanness was about 
democratic legitimacy following the trajectory of post-enlargement EU which conditioned the 
construction of different gradients of being European at the expense of Eastness. These discursive 
constructions changed as the ENP was transformed into a regional-oriented instrument with an 
Eastern perspective to envisage political and economic reforms during the second selected period of 
analysis; technocracy was much emphasized for institution building and adoption of EU laws and 
regulations, while economic freedom was stressed for EaP countries to partially integrate with the 
European single market as the European open border. These pre-existing discourses then conditioned 
the Association Agreement to focus on mostly about moral leadership and economic development 
during the period of 2012 to 2016. The discursive construction of Europeanness as moral leadership 
was evidently shown by the case of Ukraine that it was the most advanced country which set an 
example for all Eastern Partnership countries (Füle, 2014); on the other hand, the Association 
Agreement was constructed as the prerequisite of economic prosperity which would bring financial 
benefits to the EaP countries once the necessary reforms had been implemented.   
 
As conceptually defined in the section of ‘Eastness and Eastern Europe’, Eastness is the opposite end 
of the continuum of Europeanness (Kuus, 2007), therefore the discursive constructions of Eastness 
also corresponded to those of Europeanness during the selected periods for analysis (2004-16). 
During the first period of ENP, Europe’s spatial Other was constructed as the non-EU countries 
surrounding the EU which did not fully endow Europeanness to delineate themselves from Russia; 
on the other hand, Europe’s temporal Other was constructed as post-war Europe which European 
integration was much in need so as to give necessary conditions for the action orientation of EU’s 
neighbouring countries to integrate with proper Europe through political and economic reforms. As 
the reforms progressed, the discursive constructions of Europe’s temporal and spatial Others as well 
as the juxtapositions of EU values were manifested by addressing the deficiency of Europeanness, 
rejection of ‘sphere of interest’ (Rehn, 2009, p. 2), as well as the fall of Berlin Wall. These 
constructions no longer concerned the political practices in sense of the Soviet legacy, but were rather 
about the institutionalisation of the deficiency of Europeanness for implementing a tailor-made 
reform agenda for each EaP country. In the same vein, the discursive constructions of Eastness were, 
subsequently, Russia as the East’ and Europe’s spatial Other in terms of the ‘reunion’ between proper 
Europe and Eastern and Central Europe. Russia was explicitly referred to ‘the East’ which 
conditioned Ukraine’s Eastness as both countries were mutually dependent (Füle, 2014).   
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Influenced by the differentiation of different gradients of Europeanness and Eastness, the discursive 
constructions of border mostly concern the dynamics of openness and closure versus those of hard 
and soft borders in all three periods analysed above. The first period (2004-08) mainly focused on the 
natures of widening and deepening European integration based on the EU political institutions as hard 
borders and territorial borders which served to protect EU citizens. As the discursive constructions 
of Europeanness and Eastness emphasized more on technical details and institutionalization, they 
conditioned the ‘logic of closure’ (Delanty, 2003) of European external borders to exclude Eastern 
Partnership countries from being part of ‘proper Europe’, while post-Communist EU countries and 
post-Soviet neighbourhood countries were discursively constructed to be within the same 
‘civilizational constellation’ (ibidem, p. 14). The last period (2012-16) showed some significant 
changes of discursive constructions of border as conditioned by those of Europeanness and Eastness; 
the hard borders were softened as they intertwined with the cultural and civilizational borders along 
with the open structure which included Ukraine to be the post-Communist part of Europe. It was 
shown explicitly as the Association Agreement was not the final destination of EU-Ukraine relations 
(Füle, 2014); the differentiation of different degrees of Eastness between the former Socialist 
republics and the former Soviet republics did not essentialise the European external borders either 
(Füle, 2013).  
 
To this end, it is concluded that the major difference between the European open borders and hard 
borders has been blurred since the introduction of the Association Agreement; while the EU decision-
making bodies may not anticipate further changes regardless of the progress of political and economic 
reforms implemented by the EaP countries which signed the AA/DCFTA, the tangible outcomes  of 
the Agreement are not less attractive than the financial benefits of joining the EU and this minor 
difference would not change the EU-Ukraine relations fundamentally. The issue of the paradox of 
European external borders remains after the ratification of AA/DCFTA, as Ukraine has been 
categorized as the same civilizational constellation’ as the post-Communist EU countries, but this 
mode of inclusion only makes Ukraine ‘partially European’ but not ‘fully European’, thereby 
contradicting the self-identification of EU as the representative of Europe and hence the current state 
of play of EU Enlargement Process. However, the discursive construction of the EU’s soft border did 
not seem to condition the production of meaning of ‘Europe’ significantly as the AA/DCFTA 
countries including Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have been recognized as European countries (Van 
der Loo, 2017).     
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